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Drawing as Epistemic Practice in Architectural Design
Jan Bovelet
Drawing plays a central role in architecture - not 
only in the critique and scientific examination of 
already existing architecture, but also in the concep-
tion and production of new architecture. As banal 
as this remark may seem, it is the correct starting 
point for a discussion of drawing from an episte-
mological perspective. There have always been 
works that dealt with the description of drawing 
techniques relative to the available contemporary 
practices and instruments, but something that has 
not frequently been selected as a central topic in 
architectural theory is the epistemic dimension of 
drawing as a genuine form of knowledge. Drawing 
is profoundly misunderstood if it is conceptual-
ized as a mere illustrative instrument, and thus as 
a technique for representing ontologically prede-
termined - i.e. given - entities, with the relation 
between drawing and content being conceived of as 
one between a surface and an independent, deep 
structure, since, for example, different languages 
are only different expressions of one and the same 
universal grammar in Chomsky’s conception of 
structural linguistics.1 This conception of drawing as 
a tool to visualize architectural concepts completely 
ignores the a priori ordering capacity that lies within 
the epistemic dimension of drawing. Drawing is a 
specific epistemic practice for making architectural 
issues visible and thus allows for a critical examina-
tion and debate. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger described 
‘making visible’ as central to scientific research2 
and provided a heuristic for its different modes of 
(a) ‘compression and dilatation’, (b) ‘enhancement’, 
and (c) ‘schematization’.3 All modes work by means 
of different symbolic practices and economies 
embedded in historically evolving material cultures. 
In order to investigate drawing as an epistemic 
practice in architectural design, this essay takes the 
viewpoint of analysing drawing from a symbol-theo-
retical perspective and to investigate it as a symbol 
system entangled with its own specific space of 
knowledge.
The investigation of the epistemic functioning of 
drawing is all the more important in the context of 
the digitalization of architectural drawing practices. 
This digitalization is intimately tied to the develop-
ment of the logical analysis of language and the 
evolution of mathematical logic in the 20th century. 
In the line of Leibniz’s conception of the charac-
teristica universalis, the development of modern 
predicate logic fostered the idea of a binary logic 
as a basis for a universal language. This idea was 
particularly popular in the logical positivism of the 
Vienna circle. Its members aimed at mapping the 
natural language onto a precise, artificial language 
by way of substituting all meaningful sentences 
of the natural sentences with objective ‘observa-
tion sentences’.4 By using this method, they hoped 
to purge the natural language of all metaphysical 
sentences and thus arrive at an objective, universal 
language that could serve as a foundation for every 
science.
Digitalization led to an enormous success in 
what one could call the algebraization of drawing. 
The algebraization of drawing by means of digital 
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on this brief historic survey, a tentative heuristic of 
the epistemic features of drawing shall be sketched. 
And third, based on Goodman’s distinction between 
analogue and digital symbol systems, the essay 
closes with a critical review of the digitalization of 
drawing. 
Historical positions on drawing as epistemic 
practice
The idea of conceptualizing drawing as a specific 
form of knowledge can be found throughout the 
history of epistemology, although it tended to be 
underestimated due to the connection of knowledge 
with language in the Western tradition of philoso-
phy.7 In the development of logic as a discipline, the 
declarative sentence was the paradigm of logical 
propositions. This paradigm has come under attack 
in response to the dogma of logical positivism with 
its programme of establishing a universal language 
for science. Especially Jacques Derrida has criti-
cally elaborated on the logocentrism of rational 
Western metaphysics in Of Grammatology, where 
he investigates the grammatical structure of writing 
as the beginning of all thought. Richard Rorty’s proc-
lamation of a linguistic turn in 19678 was followed 
by a pictorial turn and a spatial turn, both pointing 
to the epistemic autonomy of non-textual modes of 
making visible. The specific epistemic capacities 
of drawing will be illustrated by historic examples 
in the next section in order to prepare the tentative 
heuristic of the epistemic features of drawing.
Plato already referred to the use of a drawing for 
understanding universal geometric relations in his 
famous Meno’s paradox. Aristotle also regarded 
drawing as a ‘demonstrative description’.9 It is 
remarkable that Plato was dependent on a drawing 
in order to make the anamnesis - the recovery of 
forgotten knowledge in the eternal soul - work: the 
actual material drawing is central to Socrates’s 
maieutic instruction of the slave10 and cannot be 
substituted by conceptual descriptions. 
computation is based on the translation of graphi-
cal shapes into a numerical model that can be 
manipulated via the processing of the binary code. 
The digitalization of drawing into CAD, together 
with other digital tools such as CAM, BIM, GIS, 
mass customization, social design/co-design, smart 
houses, etc., had and has a massive impact on 
architecture and architectural design. In fact, the 
impact is so massive that it seems reasonable to 
not speak of singular digital techniques any more, 
but of an extensive digital habitat. 
The idea of the construction of a universal 
language in the spirit of Leibniz’s characteristica 
universalis gained momentum particularly through 
the construction of material computation machines, 
i.e. digital computers, in the second half of the 20th 
century; as, in turn, the practical availability of this 
technology had a huge impact on the development 
of theoretical logic. Notions such as, in particular, 
Alan Turing’s concept of the universal machine ‘as 
a model of any other machine’5 from 1936 had an 
enormous influence on the conception of language 
in structural linguistics. With this setting as a back-
ground, Nelson Goodman aimed to develop a 
general symbol theory that would also include non-
verbal symbol systems and allow for a comparison 
of all sorts of different symbol systems, such as 
verbal speaking, textual writing, numerical nota-
tion, musical notation, painting, technical drawing 
and others.6 From this perspective, he developed 
a symbol-theoretical distinction between analogue 
and digital symbol systems that serves as a good 
starting point for exploring drawing as an epistemic 
practice.
To investigate drawing as epistemic practice in 
architectural design in the face of the dawn of the 
digital habitat, the essay has been organized into 
three parts. First, by way of historic examples, the 
epistemic autonomy of drawing and its main char-
acteristics shall be exposed, especially its relation 
to text/writing and pictures/painting. Second, based 
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examples is the duck-rabbit image16 with which he 
argues that seeing and thinking cannot be clearly 
distinguished from each other. Whether one sees 
a duck or a rabbit in the picture depends on which 
schemata are imposed upon it. He argues that we 
cannot see the aspect of change in the picture, but 
even though the image that is seen in the duck-
rabbit picture is identical regardless of whether one 
sees a duck or a rabbit, there has to be a cognitive 
component in the seeing. To be able to realize this 
cognitive capacity, it is necessary to perceive and 
utilize the duck-rabbit picture. Wittgenstein uses a 
drawing in his Philosophical Investigations and asks 
the reader to look at it in order to show the aspect of 
the gestalt change. He is dependent on the use of a 
drawing to show the aspect of change. 
These historic cases in point show that drawing 
comes with its own specific epistemic setting. It 
seems to be a kind of ‘third thing’, a sort of ‘graphi-
cal reasoning’ or ‘visual thinking’.17 But what is the 
specific epistemic profile of this iconic-discursive 
amalgam? 
Following the historic examples, four aspects of 
drawings can be addressed: they are epistemically 
effective by way of their use, they are essentially 
generative, they mainly aim at making relations 
operational, and they always include some sort 
of non-conceptual reasoning. Reverting to the 
perspective of symbol theory, the question is how 
a symbol system must be constituted to allow for 
a drawing to function epistemically; just as writing, 
for example, has to comply with specific notational 
conditions, such as the syntactical identity of differ-
ent instantiations of the character ‘a’. In order to be 
able to play their role in the generation of knowl-
edge, drawings also must follow rules that can be 
described in terms of symbol theory. 
In Kant’s philosophical system, a neuralgic ques-
tion is how pure conceptions such as the geometric 
figure of the circle are related to empirical phenom-
ena such as any drawn circle. This led Kant to the 
assertion that there must be some sort of mediat-
ing principle: ‘Obviously there must be some third 
thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand 
with the category, and on the other hand with the 
appearance, and which thus makes the application 
of the former to the latter possible. This mediat-
ing representation must be pure, that is, void of all 
empirical content, and yet at the same time, while 
it must in one respect be intellectual, it must in 
another be sensible. Such a representation is the 
transcendental schema.’11 Kant’s notion of tran-
scendental schemata is heavily inspired by the 
practice of drawing when he says that one ‘cannot 
represent to [oneself] a line, however small, without 
drawing it in thought, that is, generating from a point 
all its parts one after another’.12 For Kant, the epis-
temic signature of transcendental schemata lies in 
the figurative and in the process of their production, 
i.e. their status of being-in-the-making. This epis-
temic signature points to the fact that the epistemic 
function of transcendental schemata has to do with 
their relation to drawing and precedes the use of 
concepts and language.13 
The status of being-in-the-making is also central 
to Charles Sanders Peirce’s conception of the 
diagram. He sees the cognitive significance and 
the epistemic dimension of drawing in the interac-
tion with the visualization, the demonstration, and 
the production of new insights by way of diagrams. 
Accordingly, for him, diagrams and diagrammatic 
reasoning are directly or indirectly involved in all 
thinking.14
In his Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, Witt-
genstein formulated a distinction of showing and 
saying: ‘What can be shown, cannot be said.’15 He 
elaborated this distinction also in his later work in his 
exploration of reversible figures. One of his famous 
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of lines is used as a drawing is a matter of practical 
use: although there might be empirical differences 
between two hand-drawn lines in a drawing, it must 
be possible to read them as identical with regard 
to a specific end to make the composition function 
as a drawing and allow, for example, for arguments 
about proportion.
5 Referentiality
Other than pictures such as classical paintings, 
which present something real or fictional, a drawing 
aims to represent something by establishing an 
operational frame within which it can be subject 
to debate. A drawing typically refers to something 
external. The external reference is not necessarily 
something material; it can also be an immaterial 
quality like the openness of a figure ground plan, 
for example. The point being that a drawing’s objec-
tive typically is to make something accessible for 
debate which transgresses the concrete drawing. 
Not always, but often, iconicity is involved in this 
referential quality; not in a strong logical sense of a 
symmetrical relation of resemblance, but in Peirce’s 
wide sense of the word, so that, for example, a 
mathematical formula can represent a geometric 
figure.21
6 Operationality
Drawings do not objectively illustrate a given object 
or process, but they represent it in a way that opens 
up spaces - in the sense that Heidegger spoke of 
‘the opening up of […] a region’22 - within which 
the represented can be handled, observed and 
explored. They have to be regarded as epistemic 
instruments that always also generate what they 
represent. It makes, for example, no sense to talk 
about the number Zero before there is a mathemati-
cal calculus that allows for operations with the digit 
‘0’.23 Likewise, it is hard - if not pointless - to talk 
about an architectural quality such as proportional 
relations without a drawing of one or the other sort 
as a base.
A tentative heuristic
Sybille Krämer sketched six basic properties of 
diagrammatic reasoning, on which the following 
heuristic of the epistemic properties of drawings is 
based.18 
1 Two-dimensional flatness
Contrary to language, drawings do not rely on the 
temporal logic of succession but on the spatial 
logic of simultaneous order. Through the reduction 
of an extended two-dimensional plane, a drawing 
can reveal the relational order of different objects 
simultaneously, which enables the definition of 
differences.
2 Directionality
Also contrary to language, the representational 
space19 of drawings is orientated in the sense that 
the topological relations of the parts of a drawing 
allow for orientation and are thus part of the epis-
temic function of the drawing. Conversely, language 
relies on the principle of linearity.
3 Graphism
In contrast to languages, drawings do not consist of 
elements, but are rooted in the act of drawing lines. 
Lines cannot be rendered as elements in the sense 
of discrete objects, as they rely on a medium that 
they can differentiate. This is mirrored in George 
Spencer-Brown’s well-known opening statement 
regarding his calculus of form: ‘Draw a distinction.’20 
4 Syntacticity 
On the other hand, a drawing is relative to language 
in that it works grammatically, i.e. with syntactical 
structuring. Although there is no finite alphabet 
of forms, there is always something like a rela-
tive alphabet of forms involved in the ‘reading’ of 
drawings. Re-identification of specific figurative 
constellations is necessary in order to use drawings 
to process propositional knowledge. Without this 
feature, drawings could not be wrong and thus could 
not function as arguments. Whether a composition 
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sion. Lexicons and grammars are possible only 
for systems whose symbols are determinate and 
discriminable. For lexicons and grammars consist 
of generalizations that apply to symbols because 
they are tokens of specific syntactic types. Where it 
is impossible to determine the type a token belongs 
to, it is impossible to take it to be subject to lexical 
and grammatical rules. And where it is impossible to 
tell whether two symbols belong to the same type, 
it is impossible to treat them as syntactically inter-
changeable.’27
Nelson Goodman, together with Catherine Z. 
Elgin, drew here on the distinction of analogue and 
digital symbol systems Goodman developed in 
his epistemological centrepiece Languages of Art. 
Therein, he distinguished different symbol systems 
by way of their syntactic and semantic properties 
in order to mark their limitations in regard to differ-
ent practical ends. A symbol system ‘is analog if 
syntactically and semantically dense’,28 whereas it 
is digital if and only if it is ‘differentiated throughout, 
syntactically and semantically’.29 Only the latter can 
be described by means of lexical lists and the gram-
matical rules of valid combinations of items on that 
list. Analogue symbol systems, in contrast, cannot 
be conceptualized as consisting of a set of basic 
elements combined by a finite body of grammatical 
rules. The reason therefore lies in analogue symbol 
systems being defined precisely by the fact that they 
consist of infinitely many different symbols - which 
is what Goodman calls ‘syntactic density’ - and that 
there is no algorithmic way to decide whether a 
reference, e.g. an empirical object, complies with 
one and only one symbol used in the system. In a 
picture, for example, even the slightest nuance in 
the colouring can make a fundamental difference.
It is crucial to emphasize the mutual dependence 
of the definition of digital and analogue symbol 
systems in Goodman’s conception. The properties 
of analogue symbol systems such as pictures are 
explicated and specified by their contrast to those 
The tentative heuristic above shows relationships 
and differences between the epistemic modus 
operandi of texts, pictures, and drawings. Some 
aspects of drawings can be described verbally, 
whereas others cannot be substituted by concep-
tual descriptions. But the partial possibility to 
explicate a drawing by means of a text should not 
distract attention from the fact that this transforma-
tion consists of a translation between two different 
epistemic environments, which work around differ-
ent epistemic objects.24 Both environments cultivate 
different experimental systems. Experimental 
systems are the ‘smallest complete working units’25 
in the generation of knowledge; in relation to their 
respective ends, they yield different assessments 
of the epistemic role of drawings and writings as 
regards knowledge. It is crucial to keep the trans-
latory aspect of ‘scriptualized drawings’ in mind; 
for translations are bound to specific restraints as 
Willard v. O. Quine emphasized in his theses of 
indeterminacy, i.e. the indeterminacy of translation 
and the inscrutability of reference.26 The question 
is what implications the rise of the digital habitat 
and the digitalization of drawing in architectural 
design have for drawing as an epistemic practice. 
If language and, more specifically, the declarative 
sentence is the paradigmatic model for the binary 
coding of digital data processing, and the symbol 
system within which drawing is embedded, is not 
completely commensurable with the symbol system 
of written language, then there are limitations to the 
digitalization of drawing. To tackle this issue, it is a 
good starting point to discuss Nelson Goodman’s 
above-mentioned differentiation between analogue 
and digital symbol systems. 
Drawing and Digitalization
In his attempt to develop a general symbol theory 
that covers both verbal and non-verbal use of 
symbols, Goodman formulated a distinct statement 
about the use of linguistic models for pictorial symbol 
systems such as drawings: ‘The linguists’ model 
plainly cannot be extended to pictorial comprehen-
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dynamic process of analysis and organization’36 
within which digital symbol systems are being 
introduced, as a rule, ‘once the maximum required 
fineness of discrimination has been settled’.37 This 
shift is not an objective improvement in the sense of 
a cumulative progression. A digital symbol system 
can be discarded again in favour of an analogue 
one if its achievements are judged to be inadequate 
for the objects or processes to be examined. This 
oscillating shift is very common in the practices of 
architectural design; it can be seen in the back-and-
forth movement between hand-drawn sketches and 
plans produced in digital CAD environments. Both 
design methods mutually inform each other and are 
developed in parallel within the design process. And 
to ‘choose among them requires knowing how the 
several systems function’.38
To understand a digitally produced implementa-
tion plan as a purified and thus perfected sketch 
apparently does not make sense in this light. 
Both instruments aim at different ends and are 
constituted accordingly. From the point of view of 
symbol theory, digital methods are based on iden-
tical reproduction and ‘chain[s] of true copies’,39 
whereas analogue methods draw on the concept of 
difference as their guiding principle. Both aspects 
are needed in the design process; they mutually 
inform each other. Depending on the aim and the 
state of a design process, it can be crucial to be 
able to process ambiguity and thus to design in the 
framework of an analogue symbol system. Moreo-
ver, in another state of the same design process it 
can be central to being able to identify and inven-
torize the forms and properties of the designed 
objects and processes. In this perspective, the 
biggest threat to architectural design is the unre-
flected und thus uncritical application of technical 
methods and instruments without critical examina-
tion of whether, or to which degree, they match the 
properties of the designed architectural entities and 
processes. There is no formal solution to guarantee 
such matching; the appropriateness of a design tool 
of digital symbol systems, such as written texts. 
Both are constituted in keeping with their different 
epistemic ends. Consequently, it makes no sense 
to ask the question of whether either digital symbol 
systems or analogue symbol systems have a privi-
leged access to knowledge. Drawings possess 
features of both analogue and digital symbol 
systems. Following Kant’s famous dictum accord-
ing to which ‘[t]houghts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind’,30 and Rudolf 
Arnheim’s remark that ‘the beginnings of concept 
formation’ lie ‘in the perception of shape’,31 we 
have to consider that concept and appearance are 
always already entangled from the very beginning. 
Drawings are situated in between the conceptual 
and pictorial making visible processes, with their 
focus sometimes more on the syntactic structuring 
and sometimes more on the pictorial depiction. 
By drawing, traces are laid for a discourse by 
making a design idea visible and thus publicly 
debatable. The public discourse is the only scale 
against which a design can be judged. The notion of 
‘trace’ has become particularly known through the 
work of Jacques Derrida. A trace in this sense is the 
marking of a difference.32 This marking precedes 
writing and painting; it ‘is a form of manifestation 
that has not yet become either writing or picture in 
their traditional forms. The trace precedes both of 
them’.33 Digital and analogue symbol systems are 
sisters differentiated according to their respective 
ends. 
Both analogue and digital symbol systems are 
essential to knowledge production and the organi-
zation of epistemic orientation, as long as they are 
used appropriately and with an adequate amount of 
criticality.34 Whether the status of a symbol system 
is digital or analogue depends on its use; it is there-
fore futile to characterize digital symbol systems 
as precise in contrast to ambiguous analogue 
systems.35 It is more appropriate to see the ‘devel-
opment and application of symbol systems [as] a 
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but of producing genuine epistemic objects that 
can become the target of arguments and, eventu-
ally, objects of knowledge by way of conventional 
consolidation.
The observation of the epistemic role of drawings 
in the development of architectural design suggests 
that the production of knowledge is always inter-
nally entangled with the representation of the 
to-be-known. Dissenting from Alberti’s ‘new ways of 
design’,40 in which the design of an object or process 
is categorically detached from the production, 
drawing has to be seen as an epistemic technique 
‘through’ and ‘by’ which the world is organized into 
entities that can be the objectives of architectoni-
cal arguments. The notion of ‘argument’ here must 
be taken literally: like textual propositions, drawings 
can be wrong. Therefore, like languages, opera-
tional drawings are bound to a differentiable symbol 
system; not necessarily to a full-blooded digital 
symbol system, but they need to be at least ‘digitally 
applicable’ in one respect, so that they can be read 
in a syntactically ruled way. This need for syntactic-
ity suggests that parallel to the role grammar plays 
in language, there should be a diagrammatic41 that 
rules the epistemic functioning of drawings. In archi-
tectural drawings, these rules are manifest in the 
- historically contingent - conventions of drawing 
practices, such as, for example, working in compa-
rable scales or agreeing on a set of conventions 
over the specific use of line widths. 
With this tentative heuristic of the epistemic prop-
erties of drawing in mind, what can be said about 
the digitalization of drawing techniques in archi-
tectural design? As an epistemic practice, drawing 
aims at making formerly invisible relations visible.42 
It is characterized by the possibility of shifting 
dynamically between analogue and digital readings, 
and can be judged only with regard to its practical 
outcome. To what extent can an unbound digitaliza-
tion be a threat to architectural drawing? Sketching a 
figure ground plan, for example, cannot be reduced 
for a specific task can only be judged by its practi-
cal outcome. The necessity of dividing a whole into 
distinct units to match the requirements of a digital 
symbol system can never be an end in itself. CAD 
drawing instruments can only serve their purpose 
well in architectural design if they are understood 
and treated as means for relative, not final, ends. 
Establishing a design method always is commit-
ted to a cultural-critical revision of its relation to the 
objects and processes it makes visible; since this is 
something drawing in particular is concerned with.
As emphasized above, Goodman’s conceptions 
of digital and analogue symbol systems rather need 
to be seen as the poles of a continuous spectrum 
of different symbol systems. These conceptions 
are crucial reference points for the investigation of 
drawing as an epistemic form of knowledge. Even 
though from an ontological point of view a definite 
border cannot be drawn between pictures produced 
in an analogue way and digitally generated draw-
ings, they can be distinguished epistemologically by 
the former’s tendency to always aim at presenting 
something without necessarily having to represent 
something for that cause, whereas the latter primar-
ily aims at representing something, and in doing 
so, might contingently present something as well. 
This primacy of representation before presenta-
tion allows for a characterization of drawings as 
operational pictures, which stand in contrast to the 
denoting aspect of classical paintings. Drawings do 
not primarily present something through a resem-
blance to that which they are referring to, but rather 
represent something in order to take it into a discur-
sive space through visual operationalization. They 
are the medium for visual thinking, to come back to 
Arnheim’s above-mentioned notion. The epistemic 
capacity of drawing lies precisely in the spaces of 
manipulation, observation, and practice that open 
up by way of the operationality and performativity 
they establish through their way of representing 
objects or processes. Drawing does not consist of 
illustrating a genuine - and non-drawn - knowledge, 
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as ontological. This is the never-ending task of criti-
cal design: to think synoptically and to be watchful 
about the ontological implications that operational, 
material procedures might have on the design. 
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